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Upon assuming power in May, the United Kingdom’s historic coalition government set in motion three 
exercises that collectively aimed to reshape British foreign policy. Taken together, the new National 
Security Strategy (NSS), the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) and the Comprehensive 
Spending Review (CSR), seek to lay down the bounds of Britain’s future role in the world, articulate 
Britain’s national interests, establish the goals of policy and set the means by which to achieve them. 
The salience of this exercise in refocusing UK foreign policy can hardly be understated. British military, 
diplomatic and aid resources have been stretched over the past fifteen years by Britain’s global activism. 
The UK has committed significant military force to the Balkans twice, to Sierra Leone, Afghanistan 
and Iraq, and has committed to play a global leadership role on issues such as climate change, debt 
relief and development. The global economic crisis, catalysed by the banking sector on which so 
much of the UK’s strong economic performance since the mid-1990s relied, has hit Britain worse 
than most, leaving a budget deficit estimated to be as high as 12% of GDP. The United Kingdom, 
goes the analysis of the ruling coalition, has been living beyond its means, and the sections of the 
budget tasked with pursuing British foreign policy will have to accept their share of the inevitable cuts.
Whilst the government denied Opposition claims that this review of UK foreign policy was simply 
a cost-saving exercise, real strategy is a process of setting constraints as well as establishing goals. 
Timed to coincide with the government’s announcement of what should amount to a grand strategy 
for the United Kingdom, the cross-party Parliamentary committee for Public Administration released 
a report that stated that ‘the Government in Whitehall has lost the art of making national strategy 
in relation to defence and security’. Bernard Jenkin, the Conservative chairman, was not alone in 
his concern that an inability to ‘think strategically’ was fundamentally undermining the process of 
reviewing the UK’s national strategy.
This report is conceived as an attempt to address this perceived failing. The contributors here – all 
with long and distinguished careers in British foreign policy – were asked to consider Britain’s role in 
the world in the broadest sense, to identify our core interests and the most appropriate capacities 
to secure them, and to do so in recognition of the reality of the resource constraints that are coming 
to define this period in British political history. Doing so in light of the government’s proposals serves 
to shine a light on whether the result of this review process represents a coherent and appropriate 
refocusing of British strategy that reflects the world as it is, and is realistic about the United Kingdom’s 
place in it.
The result of such a broad remit for the authors is – as one might expect – a range of perspectives 
and disagreements on certain specific issues. But perhaps surprisingly there is core agreement that 
whilst the British Government’s attempt to review British strategy is laudable, the outcome has been 
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determined more by political and bureaucratic drivers 
than by sustained and coherent strategic thought, 
with the result that the ends and means of UK foreign 
policy will remain inappropriately matched.
The authors are clear that restoring the health of the 
British economy, and the UK’s ability to compete on 
the world economic stage, is central to the fulfilment 
of any of the UK’s national interests. A world that 
is increasingly globalised and multipolar offers 
opportunities to an outward-looking trading nation. 
British society and the institutions of British are well 
adapted to play a leading role in this complex order, 
but the reality of this world is that economic strength 
is what matters above all else in maintaining Britain’s 
position as a leading international actor. 
The complexity of the international order brings 
with it security challenges that are multifarious, and 
which differ from those of the past. Great power 
war appears obsolete, and whilst its return cannot 
be ruled out, nuclear weapons render that likelihood 
barely credible. The National Security Strategy, on 
balance, is a credible attempt to focus attention on 
the challenges presented by the world as it is, and 
whilst the muddled rhetoric of ‘risk’ and ‘threat’ 
is unhelpful, the effort to rank threats in terms of 
likelihood and impact is welcome, and the conclusions 
drawn broadly correct. 
The author of the NSS, the National Security Council, 
is to be overwhelmingly welcomed and deserves 
sustained support. If it can be made to work, it should 
be able to coordinate foreign policy at the most 
senior level, making processes more efficient and 
ensuring the maxims of strategy are transmitted to the 
various bureaucracies charged with implementation 
responsibilities. Overcoming the tribalism inherent 
in Whitehall budget competition will not be easy 
however, but would be aided by the introduction 
of a parliamentary oversight committee to audit 
the Council’s work and provide confidence in the 
ultimate decisions taken.
However, whilst the NSC may have thought 
realistically about the world we face, the Strategic 
Defence and Security Review which sets out the UK’s 
response to that world reflects more political and 
bureaucratic legacies than it does the requirements 
of the challenges for foreign policy identified by 
the NSS. In this sense, the linking of the SDSR to 
the wider Comprehensive Spending Review has 
undermined the Government’s ability to construct 
coherent strategy. Whilst British interests may indeed 
range widely across the globe, the maintenance of 
major capital-intensive military systems reflects a 
legacy of over-commitment in the Ministry of Defence 
and bureaucratic competition between the services 
more than it does the needs of strategy. At the same 
time, the Government’s ring-fencing of DFID, and the 
commitment to international development expressed 
as a share of GDP, has not been integrated within 
strategy: the UK’s aid budget needs to be linked more 
clearly to the national interest.
The biggest bureaucratic loser in recent years, and 
indeed in the course of this review itself, has been 
the Foreign Office. On this point the authors are 
unanimous: substantive diplomatic engagement is 
what underpins both Britain’s hard and soft power, 
and investment in the UK’s diplomatic capacity is 
crucial to the success of strategy in a world that 
increasingly depends on specific local knowledge 
born of strong and sustained relationships. Traditional 
British diplomatic strengths of flexibility, pragmatism 
and egalitarianism are uniquely suited to the complex 
world we face; cuts to what is a relatively inexpensive 
area of government spending, particularly when 
compared directly to defence and international 
development, threaten that legacy and Britain’s ability 
to play a truly effective international role. ■
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